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Abstract 19 
Kleptoparasitism (food stealing) is a significant behaviour for animals that forage in social 20 
groups as it permits some individuals to obtain resources whilst avoiding the costs of 21 
searching for their own food. Evolutionary game theory has been used to model 22 
kleptoparasitism, with a series of differential equation based compartmental models 23 
providing significant theoretical insights into behaviour in kleptoparasitic populations. In this 24 
paper we apply this compartmental modelling approach to kleptoparasitic behaviour in a real 25 
foraging population of urban gulls (Laridae). Field data was collected on kleptoparasitism 26 
and a model developed that incorporated the same kleptoparasitic and defensive strategies 27 
available to the study population. Two analyses were conducted: 1. An assessment of whether 28 
the density of each behaviour in the population was at an equilibrium. 2. An investigation of 29 
whether individual foragers were using Evolutionarily Stable Strategies (ESS) in the correct 30 
environmental conditions. The results showed the density of different behaviours in the 31 
population could be at an equilibrium at plausible values for handling time and fight duration. 32 
Individual foragers used aggressive kleptoparasitic strategies effectively in the correct 33 
environmental conditions but some individuals in those same conditions failed to defend food 34 
items. This was attributed to the population being composed of three species that differed in 35 
competitive ability. These competitive differences influenced the strategies that individuals 36 
were able to use. Rather than gulls making poor behavioural decisions these results suggest a 37 
more complex three-species model is required to describe the behaviour of this population.  38 
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Introduction 41 
Kleptoparasitism is defined as the theft of already procured food by one individual from 42 
another (Brockmann & Barnard, 1979). It is one of the most widespread forms of exploitation 43 
found in nature  having been observed across several taxonomic groups, including spiders 44 
(Coyle et al. 1991), insects (Erlandsson, 1988), mammals (Janson, 1985; Carbone et al. 2005) 45 
and birds (Barnard, 1990; Brockmann & Barnard, 1979).  The significance of kleptoparasitic 46 
behaviour is that it allows individuals to avoid some of the costs of the foraging cycle 47 
(searching for, acquiring and handling food items) by exploiting food discovered by another 48 
individual’s effort (Giraldeau & Caraco, 2000).  49 
As a behaviour with a potentially significant impact on fitness, kleptoparasitism has 50 
attracted the interest of researchers and, due to the prevalence of kleptoparasitic species 51 
within the class Aves, research effort has focused on birds more than other taxa. Amongst the 52 
birds, some species specialise in an almost entirely parasitic lifestyle, such as the skuas 53 
(Sterciraridae) and frigatebirds (Fregatidae). In other species kleptoparasitism is just one of 54 
a number of foraging strategies used. Brockmann & Barnard (1979) conducted a review of 55 
kleptoparasitic incidents reported in the ornithological literature over a forty-year period. 56 
From this they identified the taxonomic families containing the largest number of 57 
kleptoparasitic species. The families of birds with the highest numbers of kleptoparasites 58 
were the Falconidae (falcons, kestrels, caracaras), Accipitridae (hawks, eagles, harriers, old 59 
world vultures), and the Laridae (gulls). The presence of kleptoparasitism in the Laridae 60 
being much more pronounced than in the other families with 23 of the 88 species of gull 61 
making use of kleptoparasitic strategies. The significant investment of gulls in 62 
kleptoparasitism highlights the value of this strategy to those species making them an 63 
important family of birds for research into kleptoparasitism (Verbeek, 1977a; Verbeek, 64 
1977b; Barnard & Thompson, 1985; Spencer et al. 2017).  65 
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Kleptoparasitic interactions occur when individuals forage socially (Barnard, 1984), 66 
and gulls are highly gregarious (Perrins, 2009). Much of the sociality of gulls outside the 67 
breeding season consists of mixed-species feeding aggregations around ephemeral food 68 
sources (Tinbergen, 1953; Perrins, 2009). These aggregations are complex competitive 69 
situations of the type likely to encourage kleptoparasitism as a foraging strategy. In gulls, 70 
kleptoparasitism has also been shown to be a facultative response to changing environmental 71 
conditions (Maniscalco & Ostrand, 1997). High levels of kleptoparasitism are more likely 72 
when certain environmental conditions prevail (Brockmann & Barnard, 1979), these include 73 
high densities of foragers and high concentrations of larger food items (Spencer et al. 2017).  74 
Further, kleptoparasitism is not a unitary concept (Giraldeau & Caraco, 2000) and 75 
theft can be enacted through one of three kleptoparasitic strategies that have been described. 76 
These are aggressive kleptoparasitism (use of force or threat to steal food – Hansen, 1986; 77 
Liker & Barta, 2002), stealth kleptoparasitism (sneaky theft with limited interaction between 78 
kleptoparasite and host – Hockey et al. 1989) and scramble kleptoparasitism (theft by 79 
multiple individuals – Erlandsson, 1988). The quantity and divisibility of food items, as well 80 
as competitive differences between foragers will clearly influence which of these strategies 81 
are used when a kleptoparasitic population exploits a finite patch of resources. The fact that 82 
gulls frequently forage in mixed-species flocks, differ in size and competitive ability between 83 
species and are opportunistic foragers with a diverse diet suggests that all three of these 84 
strategies may be utilised if the correct social and environmental circumstances are 85 
encountered.  86 
Following Giraldeau & Caraco (2000) we define a behaviour to be social foraging if 87 
two or more individuals associate and the functional consequences of their foraging 88 
behaviours are interdependent. Kleptoparasitism can be considered a social foraging strategy, 89 
a consequence of this is that the best foraging decision an individual can make depends on 90 
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what other individuals in the population are doing. Giraldeau & Caraco (2000) defined this as 91 
the “concurrent economic interdependence among different individuals’ payoffs and 92 
penalties” (p.3). A critical implication of this is that the analysis of kleptoparasitic behaviours 93 
requires the use of game theory. Indeed, contests over resources of this nature were among 94 
the foundational questions initially addressed by evolutionary game theory (Maynard Smith, 95 
1982). Several approaches have been taken to modelling kleptoparasitism using game theory, 96 
these include Producer-Scrounger (P-S) Models (Barnard & Sibly, 1981) and 97 
Kleptoparasitism Models (Broom & Ruxton, 1998).  98 
P-S models identify the equilibrium or stable level of kleptoparasitism that should 99 
occur in a given population. A key feature of such models is that food items, or the items of 100 
food within a patch, are highly divisible. This can be a realistic assumption when studying 101 
certain species, for example, the patches exploited by many seed feeding passerines often 102 
contain many small items that can be shared between numerous foragers (Barnard & Sibly, 103 
1981). However, frequently food patches will contain fewer items that have only limited 104 
divisibility. This was true of the foraging environment exploited by the gull population that 105 
was the focus of this research.  106 
The Kleptoparasitism Models developed by Broom and colleagues (Broom & Ruxton, 107 
1998; Broom et al., 2004) model foraging situations where food items come in single units 108 
that have limited divisibility and are often completely consumed by an individual forager. 109 
These Kleptoparasitism Models can be used to analyse the frequency of producing to 110 
scrounging behaviour, much like P-S models, but have an advantage over P-S models in that 111 
they can also be used to investigate the conditions that promote the theft of food and to assess 112 
the best decision individual foragers can make given those conditions. In this research we 113 
considered all three of these analyses when investigating the kleptoparasitic behaviours of a 114 
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foraging gull population, so we adopted Kleptoparasitism Models as the most appropriate 115 
modelling technique.  116 
Kleptoparasitism Models (Broom & Ruxton, 1998; Broom & Ruxton, 2003; Broom et 117 
al. 2004; Broom & Rychtar, 2007; Broom & Rychtar, 2009; Hadjichrysanthou & Broom, 118 
2012) have systematically explored the kleptoparasitic foraging space, often changing key 119 
variables of the model one at a time to examine how this influenced behaviour. For example, 120 
the initial model in this series by Broom & Ruxton (1998), based on a mechanistic model by 121 
Ruxton & Moody (1997), considered a population of foragers where a searcher, upon 122 
encountering another forager handling a food item, was faced with the decision whether to 123 
ignore that handler and keep searching for food items or attempt to steal food from the 124 
handler. The handler was assumed always to defend its food item from attempts to steal it. In 125 
a later model (Broom et al. 2004) the assumption that the handler always defends was relaxed 126 
and the handler was given the option of whether to defend the food item or surrender it 127 
without a fight. The key features of the models developed by Broom and colleagues are: a 128 
foraging population of a fixed density; a compartmental approach to modelling the population 129 
where individuals can be in only one behavioural state at a time (e.g.. handling, searching or 130 
fighting) and the rates of change between those behavioural states are described by a system 131 
of differential equations; the assumption, previously mentioned, that food items come in 132 
single units that have limited divisibility and are consumed completely by an individual 133 
forager; as well as the use of time to model all foraging costs. Here, searching for food items, 134 
handling a food item, and engaging in a fight to either try to steal or keep hold of a food item 135 
all have a cost in terms of time. The costs incurred by the forager for making the incorrect 136 
behavioural decision accumulate over time because, whilst it is engaged in the wrong 137 
behaviour, it loses the opportunity to be doing something else that could more quickly lead to 138 
the acquisition of a food item and is thereby more profitable.  139 
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The kleptoparasitism modelling approach can be extended in many ways to consider 140 
various constraints and assumptions in relation to the environment and foragers. For example, 141 
the complexity of the basic model can be increased by introducing competitive differences 142 
between foragers in the population and by increasing the number of behavioural strategies 143 
they can use. These models, whilst more complex to find solutions for,  still assume a forager 144 
seeks to maximise its rate of food or energy intake whilst foraging and this is achieved by 145 
choosing the behaviours that minimise the amount of time needed to obtain and consume 146 
food items.  147 
The complexity of organisms, particularly when studied in wild populations means we 148 
must often rely on simple measurements that act as proxies for fitness (Hunt & Hodgson, 149 
2010). An animal’s food intake rate can be seen as a proxy for fitness mediated through 150 
survivorship. Survivorship is a key component of fitness (Hunt & Hodgson, 2010), so an 151 
animal that maximises its long-term rate of food intake will, on average, have higher 152 
survivorship relative to other foragers in the population with whom it is competing. This 153 
higher feeding rate is assumed to translate into a fitness advantage for that individual and the 154 
genes that encode for the successful strategy it uses (Grafen, 1991).     155 
Kleptoparasitism Models developed by Broom and colleagues have provided many 156 
theoretical insights into the behaviours we should expect to be prevalent in a population, 157 
however, little empirical work has been conducted to test these models or to compare their 158 
predictions against the behaviour of real foragers. This is because it is difficult to find real 159 
foraging populations that match all the simplifying assumptions necessary for comparison 160 
against a mathematical model. 161 
In this research the compartmental kleptoparasitism modelling approach was used to 162 
investigate the behaviours of a real population of gulls foraging in an urban environment. 163 
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This was a population at Billingsgate Market, London, UK. The population at Billingsgate 164 
consists of three gull species all competing to exploit food resources in the car park area of 165 
the market.  166 
A number of features of the foraging environment and the gull population at 167 
Billingsgate made it a useful candidate for using mathematical modelling as a study tool. 168 
First, the site is an anthropogenic environment and not a complex natural food web. This 169 
allowed us to consider Billingsgate as a kind of natural laboratory. The foraging area at 170 
Billingsgate is discrete and of a fixed size (the car park area), so travel time costs between 171 
patches in the foraging area could be largely discounted. In addition, the population at 172 
Billingsgate consists of three gull species all competing to exploit the same anthropogenic 173 
food discards, there are no other trophic levels involved, no other competitor species from 174 
outside the Laridae family and no predator species that might affect foraging behaviour that 175 
needed to be considered. The gulls show high levels of habituations to humans and their 176 
vehicles at this site; we noted this during field observations through the birds’ short flight 177 
initiation distances. The presence of humans clearly influences foraging behaviour but this is 178 
largely through these birds having associated humans and their vehicles with the presence of 179 
food at the site. Humans were viewed primarily as an opportunity for food as opposed to a 180 
perceived predatory risk. All of the above factors made it easier to meet some of the 181 
simplifying assumptions necessary when trying to model behaviour mathematically.  182 
Second, as all three study species were gull species they effectively have the same 183 
behavioural abilities and design with which to manipulate their environment when foraging, 184 
despite differing in competitive ability due to size differences. Having a standardised model 185 
forager again simplified the mathematics needed to model the foraging situation.  186 
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Third, the population at Billingsgate is stable. Birds are able to arrive and leave but on 187 
the whole the size and composition of the population exploiting food resources at the site 188 
remained fairly constant. Headcounts for the population, over the year of study, showed that 189 
the mean population size varied very little from month to month, having a small standard 190 
deviation relative to the mean. The population consisted of only the three study species and 191 
comparisons of headcounts for the total population and headcounts for patches showed a 192 
great deal of correspondence between the proportion of each species engaged in foraging and 193 
the proportion of each species in the population as a whole. This stability made the 194 
boundaries of the Billingsgate study population more clearly demarcated than is often 195 
possible for a wild population of birds. This fits with the assumption of a foraging population 196 
of fixed density used in this modelling approach.  197 
Fourth, the real foraging data recorded at Billingsgate was obtained using 198 
observational field methods. This meant that it was not possible to directly measure the 199 
energetic costs of fighting over a food item or any possible injury costs to the individuals 200 
involved. However, the observational methods used did permit the costs of fights and 201 
searching for food items to be measured in terms of the duration of time they took, this 202 
matched the method for assessing costs used in the various models developed by Broom and 203 
colleagues. 204 
Fieldwork was conducted at Billingsgate Market to record the kleptoparasitic 205 
interactions occurring between the gulls in that environment. The compartmental modelling 206 
approach was then used to develop a model of that population using the population 207 
parameters and strategies available to the foraging gulls at Billingsgate. The model was 208 
compared to the foraging behaviour recorded at Billingsgate to assess whether different 209 
behaviours were at equilibrium densities in the population and to conduct an analysis of 210 
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whether individuals in the Billingsgate population are making the best behavioural responses 211 
in their use of kleptoparasitism. 212 
As natural selection is expected to produce foragers that are efficient and make 213 
effective behavioural decisions, it was predicted that the density of distinct foraging 214 
behaviours at Billingsgate would be at or close to equilibrium densities predicted by the 215 
model. As food at this site is limited in divisibility and quantity and the population is stable, 216 
we can expect there to be a minimum level of competition below which the population rarely 217 
falls, even if the composition of individual patches varies. Although we were unable to mark 218 
individual birds, the few colour ringed birds and birds with plumage aberrations or old 219 
injuries that were distinctive were sighted repeatedly suggesting that some of the birds 220 
foraging at Billingsgate were there consistently. In addition, the food that is available at the 221 
site is regularly scheduled, it occurs between certain hours of the day in predictable locations 222 
and in some cases is provided by the same individuals, parked in the same place, disposing of 223 
their discards at about the same time, making the competitions individuals engage in 224 
iterations of very similar contests over resources. Based on these factors we expected gulls at 225 
Billingsgate to be effective at making economic decisions regarding when to attempt 226 
kleptoparasitism and when to not. Foragers at Billingsgate were thereby expected to have 227 
converged over time to equilibrium densities of the different foraging behaviours present in 228 
the population.  229 
Further, it was predicted that individual gulls in the foraging population would also be 230 
effective at deciding which behavioural strategy was the best in different environmental 231 
conditions and at adjusting their behaviour accordingly as environmental parameters in 232 
individual patches, such as food availability and population density, changed (Sirot, 2000). 233 
This was expected as kleptoparasitic strategies in wild gull populations have in previous 234 
research been shown to be facultative responses to changing environmental conditions 235 
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(Maniscalco & Ostrand, 1997) and as kleptoparasitism is ubiquitous among these species, 236 
that are highly mobile and encounter varied environmental conditions, it is assumed to be a 237 
beneficial foraging strategy with significant adaptive value.  238 
 239 
Methods 240 
Study Site and Species 241 
Study Site: Billingsgate Market, London (Lat: 51°30'20.40"N; Long: 0°00'43.90"W) is a 242 
seafood market in the Canary Wharf area of East London. Research at this location was 243 
conducted in a car park area used by fishmongers to process and load their stock onto vans, 244 
called the Trader’s Car Park. The Trader’s Car Park covered an area of 0.0104 square 245 
kilometres (10,400𝑚2). The size of this area was calculated using scaled aerial photographs 246 
from google maps. Figure 1 shows the boundaries of the Trader’s Car Park from an aerial 247 
position.   248 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 249 
Study Species: Gulls aggregate at Billingsgate to exploit seafood waste and leftovers 250 
discarded in the car park areas. The population of gulls found at this site consists of the Great 251 
Black-backed gull (GBB: Larus marinus), Herring gull (HG: Larus argentatus) and Black-252 
headed gull (BHG: Chroicocephalus ridibundus). The exact history of the presence of a 253 
foraging gull population at Billingsgate is unknown; however, the site has been operating as a 254 
fish market in its current location since 1982. It is likely that gulls have been exploiting 255 
resources at this site for much of this time. The only other species’ that occasionally exploit 256 
food opportunities at this site are small numbers of visitors from the Corvidae and 257 
Columbidae bird families. However, these species are infrequent visitors that largely avoid 258 
foraging groups of gulls.  259 
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Measures 260 
Population size and composition: The size and composition of the population at Billingsgate 261 
was calculated using two methods. The first used headcount photos to count the total size and 262 
composition of the population present at the site. The size of the gull population at 263 
Billingsgate was calculated using headcounts from scan samples at 30 minute intervals. The 264 
number and species of gulls at the site were recorded. The second used headcounts at 265 
foraging patches to calculate the number and species of gulls engaged in foraging behaviour. 266 
Videos of foraging patches were viewed and a record made of the number and species of all 267 
individuals that attended the patch to forage.  268 
Kleptoparasitism: Kleptoparasitism was recorded as frequency counts. Kleptoparasitic 269 
behaviours were deemed to have taken place if the strategies of aggressive or stealth 270 
kleptoparasitism, described by Giraldeau & Caraco (2000), were used. These were 271 
operationalised as follows: 272 
Aggressive kleptoparasitism: Aggressive kleptoparasitism occurred if the parasite used force 273 
or threats to attempt kleptoparasitism through any of the behaviours described in Table 1. The 274 
use of threats constituted attempted kleptoparasitism without the incident necessarily 275 
escalating to physical contact between the parasite and the host as the host could choose to 276 
surrender the food item rather than defend it. Successful use of aggressive kleptoparasitism 277 
occurred only if the parasite obtained the whole of the food item being contested, either by 278 
physically taking it or if the host surrendered the item following one of the threats described 279 
(Table 1).  280 
Stealth kleptoparasitism: Stealth kleptoparasitism was typified by the use of speed to 281 
approach, grab the food item and try to make off without directly confronting the handler for 282 
the item.  Behaviours constituting stealth kleptoparasitism are described in Table 1. If the 283 
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parasite managed to obtain any proportion of the food item being contested successful use of 284 
stealth kleptoparasitism had occurred.  285 
Host responses to kleptoparasitism: Analysis was conducted to evaluate the response of hosts 286 
when attacked by kleptoparasites. Hosts could either try to defend the food item they were 287 
handling or surrender the item to the kleptoparasite. Of the 577 kleptoparasitic attempts 288 
recorded, a strategy (surrender or defend) could be attributed to the host on 321 occasions. A 289 
conservative criterion was used to avoid misattributing defensive strategies. On the 256 290 
occasions where it was not possible to attribute a strategy this was often because the 291 
observer’s view of the handler became obstructed at the crucial moment. This was common 292 
due to the frantic nature of the foraging activity in patches. 293 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 294 
Procedure 295 
Observations at Billingsgate were conducted between the hours of 7am and 3pm. The trading 296 
hours for the market are 3am to 8:30am. After 8:30am the main activity at the site is the 297 
clean-up of the market and car park areas. Prior to 7am it was not possible to conduct 298 
observations as the large number of vehicles at the site made unobstructed observations of the 299 
study area unfeasible. After 7am the car park emptied considerably making it easier to 300 
conduct observations. This was the time that the largest number of gulls foraged in the car 301 
park. Field sessions had a mean duration of 2 hours 52 minutes (Range: 2h – 5h 05m) and 302 
were conducted on days when the market was operational (Tuesday – Saturday) and when it 303 
was closed (Sunday, Monday). A total of 80 hours 15 minutes of field observations were 304 
conducted over 33 field days across the course of a calendar year between July 2014 and June 305 
2015.  306 
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Observations were conducted from a vehicle. On each study day the location that 307 
would give the best unobstructed view of the study area was identified and used as the 308 
observation position for that field session. It was not always possible to use the same position 309 
as the unpredictable nature of vehicular traffic at the site meant a good observation point one 310 
day may have a view obstructed by a large vehicle the next. Food resources at the site were 311 
located in discrete patches where they were either spilled or discarded on the ground. When 312 
patches of food were discovered by gulls they were filmed from inside the vehicle using a 313 
Sony 8.9 megapixel HD camcorder. Using the vehicle as a hide in this way meant that the 314 
presence of the researcher did not disturb foraging behaviour in the study area. Patches were 315 
filmed until the resource in the patch had depleted and the birds dispersed. Over the year of 316 
study 183 foraging patches were recorded and the time taken to deplete these patches ranged 317 
in duration from 0 minutes 25 seconds to 29 minutes 36 seconds. The location of patches 318 
within the study area, the start and end time of the patch and the headcount and species of the 319 
gulls present at the patch were recorded. Patch videos were analysed at a later time for 320 
kleptoparasitic incidents, where the species, strategy and outcome of the interaction were 321 
noted. Patch videos were also analysed to assess the rate of food intake through foraging at 322 
the site. This involved counting all occasions when foragers in a patch sampled the ground 323 
for a food item, and all occasions when they actually obtained a food item. The species and 324 
number of individuals exploiting a foraging patch was also recorded.   325 
To identify the strategies used by foragers at Billingsgate, focal animal observations 326 
were conducted using video recordings of foraging patches. Individual foragers were 327 
observed as they moved around the patch and a continuous record was made of their foraging 328 
behaviours, indicating whether they sampled for food items, attacked using AGG, attacked 329 
using ST and, when handling, whether they defended, resisted or surrendered against attacks 330 
by other foragers. These focal animal observations were used to build up a picture of the 331 
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forager’s behaviour and to attribute a strategy to the forager based on the ESS strategies 332 
outlined in Table 4.  333 
Headcounts of the total population were conducted at 30 minute intervals from the 334 
start of a field session. A series of photographs was taken using a Nikon Coolpix P510 (42x 335 
zoom) bridge camera, to capture all gulls in the study area. These photographs were later 336 
analysed to calculate the population size and composition. 337 
 338 
The model 339 
The foraging behaviours considered in this model are: searching for food items, handling 340 
food items, and two kleptoparasitic strategies, aggressive kleptoparasitism and stealth 341 
kleptoparasitism. A forager encountering a handler can choose to ignore the handler and keep 342 
searching or attack the handler using either aggressive or stealth kleptoparasitism. Similarly, 343 
a handler attacked by another forager can choose to defend or surrender its food item. These 344 
interactions effectively encapsulated the behaviours of interest present in the Billingsgate 345 
population. Although there is potentially a third type of kleptoparasitic strategy described by 346 
Giraldeau & Caraco (2000) that gulls can use, ‘scramble kleptoparasitism’, where multiple 347 
foragers simultaneously steal portions of a food item, it was not included in the model due to 348 
its lack of occurrence at Billingsgate.  349 
The model developed here considers a population containing one species of forager. 350 
This single-species model reduced the complexity of the mathematics needed to model the 351 
foraging population and the model was compared against the averaged foraging data obtained 352 
for the whole population at Billingsgate. Although the Billingsgate population contained 3 353 
species, with kleptoparasitism occurring both within and between species, the assumption 354 
was made that averaging the data over the whole year of study would smooth out any 355 
17 
 
asymmetries in competitive ability between individuals and species and permit the population 356 
to be viewed as a large population containing just one-species.   357 
Broom et al. (2004) considered a population of foragers that can either attack or 358 
ignore handlers and defend or surrender food items. The model developed here extends this 359 
by considering two types of kleptoparasitic strategy and we retain and extend the notation and 360 
parameters used in Broom et al. (2004) where necessary. The foraging population consists of 361 
a population density of 𝑃 individuals. That foraging population (𝑃) consists of groups of 362 
individuals in different behavioural states or compartments. A forager can only be engaged in 363 
one behavioural state and thereby can only be in one compartment at a time. At any time a 364 
proportion of the foraging population are searching (𝑆) for food items and a proportion are 365 
handling (𝐻) a food item. An average density 𝑓 of food items is available and a forager can 366 
search the foraging area at a rate 𝑣𝑓 for food items. The rate at which food items are 367 
discovered is therefore 𝑣𝑓𝑓. Similarly, the rate at which a forager can search the foraging area 368 
for handlers is 𝑣ℎ, so the rate at which searchers encounter handlers of food items is 𝑣ℎ𝐻. 369 
Following Broom et al. (2004), the time that food items take to handle is modelled using an 370 
exponential probability distribution with mean 𝑡ℎ. Additionally, a proportion of the foraging 371 
population are engaged in fights over food items, either as kleptoparasites trying to steal an 372 
item or handlers trying to keep hold of that food item. As stated previously, two 373 
kleptoparasitic strategies are possible within this population: aggressive kleptoparasitism or 374 
stealth kleptoparasitism. At any given time a proportion of the foraging population (𝑃) will 375 
be attempting to steal items using aggressive kleptoparasitism (𝐴) and a proportion of 376 
handlers will be fighting against those kleptoparasites by trying to defend (𝐷) their food item 377 
from being stolen. Likewise, a proportion of the foraging population will be attempting to 378 
steal using stealth kleptoparasitism (𝐶) and an equal proportion of handlers will be fighting 379 
to resist (𝑅) their food item being stolen by stealth kleptoparasites. Defending and resisting 380 
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are terms that both describe the defensive behaviour of handlers that are under attack, 381 
separate terms were used, for defending against aggressive kleptoparasitism and resisting 382 
against stealth kleptoparasitism, to differentiate the two behaviours as the probability of 383 
defensive behaviour against one type of kleptoparasitism might differ from that of the other 384 
type. Defenders (𝐷) and Resistors (𝑅) are therefore separate behavioural states in the 385 
foraging population (𝑃). The composition of the total foraging population by compartments 386 
that capture the different behavioural states is described by equation (1),  387 
 388 
𝑃 = 𝑆 + 𝐻 + 𝐴 + 𝐷 + 𝐶 + 𝑅.                                                                                                                           (1) 389 
 390 
 Once a searcher encounters a handler it either attacks the handler using aggressive 391 
kleptoparasitism, it does this with probability 𝑝1, or it attacks the handler using stealth 392 
kleptoparasitism, this occurs with probability 𝑝2, otherwise it ignores the handler and 393 
continues searching for undiscovered food items, this occurs with probability 1 − 𝑝1 − 𝑝2 394 
(note that this means 𝑝1 + 𝑝2 ≤ 1, e.g. see Table 4). Conversely, a handler that is found and 395 
attacked with aggressive kleptoparasitism can either defend against the attack, which it does 396 
with probability 𝑝3, or surrender the food item without a fight, which occurs with probability 397 
1 − 𝑝3. Likewise, a handler that is attacked by a searcher using stealth kleptoparasitism 398 
resists the attack with probability 𝑝4 or surrenders the food item without a fight with 399 
probability 1 − 𝑝4. If a searcher attacks using aggressive or stealth kleptoparasitism and the 400 
handler defends or resists then a fight occurs. The fight lasts for a time duration that is 401 
modelled using an exponential probability distribution. In the case of aggressive 402 
kleptoparasitism the duration of the fight is drawn from an exponential distribution with 403 
mean 𝑡𝑎 2⁄ , the attacker wins the fight with probability 𝛼 and the defender wins the fight with 404 
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probability 1 − 𝛼. The duration of a stealth kleptoparasitism fight is also drawn from an 405 
exponential distribution with mean 𝑡𝑐 2⁄ . The stealth attacker wins the fight with probability 406 
𝛽 and the resistor wins the fight with probability 1 − 𝛽. The mean duration of stealth and 407 
aggressive fights differs as a stealth fight involves less of an interaction between attacker and 408 
handler than an aggressive fight so on average 𝑡𝑐 < 𝑡𝑎. At the end of a fight of either type the 409 
winner begins handling the contested food item and the loser resumes searching, either for 410 
food items or other handlers. The notation used for the strategies and parameters described 411 
above is summarised in Table 2.  412 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 413 
If the foraging population described above and encapsulated in equation (1) is assumed to 414 
consist of only one species then the dynamics of that population are captured by the 415 
compartmental model outlined in Figure 2.  416 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 417 
The change in the density of each behavioural compartment as described by the rates 418 
of inflow and outflow along the arrows shown in Figure 2, within the closed system defined 419 
by equation (1), is described by the following system of 6 differential equations (2-7):  420 
 
𝑑𝑆
𝑑𝑡
=
1
𝑡ℎ
𝐻 +
2
𝑡𝑐
(1 − 𝛽)𝐶 +
2
𝑡𝑐
𝛽𝑅 +
2
𝑡𝑎
(1 − 𝛼)𝐴 +
2
𝑡𝑎
𝛼𝐷 − 𝑣𝑓𝑓𝑆 − 𝑝1𝑝3𝑣ℎ𝑆𝐻 − 𝑝2𝑝4𝑣ℎ𝑆𝐻,                          (2) 421 
 
𝑑𝐻
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑣𝑓𝑓𝑆 +
2
𝑡𝑐
𝛽𝐶 +
2
𝑡𝑐
(1 − 𝛽)𝑅 +
2
𝑡𝑎
𝛼𝐴 +
2
𝑡𝑎
(1 − 𝛼)𝐷 −
1
𝑡ℎ
𝐻 − 𝑝1𝑝3𝑣ℎ𝑆𝐻 − 𝑝2𝑝4𝑣ℎ𝑆𝐻,                        (3) 422 
 
𝑑𝐶
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑝2𝑝4𝑣ℎ𝑆𝐻 −
2
𝑡𝑐
𝐶,                                                                                                                                                       (4) 423 
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𝑑𝑅
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑝2𝑝4𝑣ℎ𝑆𝐻 −
2
𝑡𝑐
𝑅,                                                                                                                                                         (5) 424 
 
𝑑𝐴
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑝1𝑝3𝑣ℎ𝑆𝐻 −
2
𝑡𝑎
𝐴,                                                                                                                                                         (6) 425 
 
𝑑𝐷
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑝1𝑝3𝑣ℎ𝑆𝐻 −
2
𝑡𝑎
𝐷.                                                                                                                                                        (7) 426 
 
Analysis 427 
The model was analysed and solved through three stages where equilibrium densities of the 428 
different behaviours and candidate ESS’s were identified. 429 
Stage 1: Equilibrium densities of the behavioural compartments: 430 
The foraging population under consideration is assumed to converge over time towards the 431 
equilibrium state (Luther & Broom (2004) provide a proof of why such an assumption is 432 
justified); this is the point at which the number of individuals in the different behavioural 433 
compartments is not changing and is found by setting each of equations 2 to 7 equal to zero 434 
and solving. So, the behavioural compartments in the population are at equilibrium densities 435 
when: 436 
𝑑𝑆
𝑑𝑡
=
𝑑𝐻
𝑑𝑡
=
𝑑𝐶
𝑑𝑡
=
𝑑𝑅
𝑑𝑡
=
𝑑𝐴
𝑑𝑡
=
𝑑𝐷
𝑑𝑡
= 0.                                                                                                                         (8) 437 
Equations 4, 5, 6 and 7 were solved first. The solutions for these equations were then 438 
substituted for 𝐶,𝑅, 𝐴 and 𝐷 in equation 2 to give the equilibrium density of searchers (𝑆) 439 
shown in equation 9. Equation 9 was then substituted for 𝑆 into the solutions for 𝐶,𝑅, 𝐴 and 440 
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𝐷 to give equilibrium solutions for these four behavioural compartments specified in terms of 441 
only one unknown variable 𝐻, the density of handlers (Note that 𝑆 is already explicit in terms 442 
of 𝐻). These solutions are given in equations 10, 11, 12 and 13.  443 
𝑆 =
𝐻
𝑡ℎ𝑣𝑓𝑓
,                                                                                                                                                                           (9) 444 
𝐶 =
1
2
𝑝2𝑝4𝑡𝑐𝑣ℎ𝐻
2
𝑡ℎ𝑣𝑓𝑓
,                                                                                                                                                           (10) 445 
𝑅 =
1
2
𝑝2𝑝4𝑡𝑐𝑣ℎ𝐻
2
𝑡ℎ𝑣𝑓𝑓
,                                                                                                                                                          (11) 446 
𝐴 =
1
2
𝑝1𝑝3𝑡𝑎𝑣ℎ𝐻
2
𝑡ℎ𝑣𝑓𝑓
,                                                                                                                                                         (12) 447 
𝐷 =
1
2
𝑝1𝑝3𝑡𝑎𝑣ℎ𝐻
2
𝑡ℎ𝑣𝑓𝑓
.                                                                                                                                                    (13) 448 
 To find the equilibrium density of handlers, the five equilibrium solution (9-13) were 449 
substituted into equation 1 giving equation 14, which simplifies to equation 15.  450 
𝑃 =
𝐻
𝑡ℎ𝑣𝑓𝑓
+ 𝐻 +
1
2
𝑝2𝑝4𝑡𝑐𝑣ℎ𝐻
2
𝑡ℎ𝑣𝑓𝑓
+
1
2
𝑝2𝑝4𝑡𝑐𝑣ℎ𝐻
2
𝑡ℎ𝑣𝑓𝑓
+
1
2
𝑝1𝑝3𝑡𝑎𝑣ℎ𝐻
2
𝑡ℎ𝑣𝑓𝑓
+
1
2
𝑝1𝑝3𝑡𝑎𝑣ℎ𝐻
2
𝑡ℎ𝑣𝑓𝑓
,                        (14) 451 
⇒ 𝑃 =
𝐻
𝑡ℎ𝑣𝑓𝑓
+ 𝐻 +
𝑝2𝑝4𝑡𝑐𝑣ℎ𝐻
2
𝑡ℎ𝑣𝑓𝑓
+
𝑝1𝑝3𝑡𝑎𝑣ℎ𝐻
2
𝑡ℎ𝑣𝑓𝑓
.                                                                                          (15) 452 
 Equation 15 was solved for 𝐻 to give quadratic equation 16, and the equilibrium 453 
density of handlers is the positive solution to equation 16 depicted using the quadratic 454 
formula in equation 17. Appendix A gives detailed solutions for the system.   455 
−(𝑝1𝑝3𝑡𝑎 + 𝑝2𝑝4𝑡𝑐)𝑣ℎ𝐻
2 − (1 + 𝑡ℎ𝑣𝑓𝑓)𝐻 + 𝑡ℎ𝑣𝑓𝑓𝑃 = 0,                                                                           (16) 456 
⇒
1 + 𝑡ℎ𝑣𝑓𝑓 ± √(1 + 𝑡ℎ𝑣𝑓𝑓)2 − 4 × −(𝑝1𝑝3𝑡𝑎 + 𝑝2𝑝4𝑡𝑐)𝑣ℎ × 𝑡ℎ𝑣𝑓𝑓𝑃
2 × −(𝑝1𝑝3𝑡𝑎 + 𝑝2𝑝4𝑡𝑐)𝑣ℎ
= 𝐻.                                          (17) 457 
Stage 2: Conditions for using kleptoparasitism and defending/resisting against 458 
kleptoparasitic attacks:  459 
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This section outlines the conditions when it is advantageous for an individual forager to 460 
attempt kleptoparasitism upon encountering a handler or to defend/resist against 461 
kleptoparasitism when that forager is a handler that has just been challenged. The two types 462 
of kleptoparasitism, aggressive and stealth are abbreviated to AGG and ST for convenience 463 
hereafter.  464 
Some additional assumptions of the model are introduced here. The payoffs obtained 465 
from a fight are measured in terms of units of a food item. The assumption is made that if a 466 
forager attacks using AGG and wins the fight it obtains the whole of the food item contested, 467 
so the gain obtained is the probability of winning times the value of the item, which is 1 468 
(representing one whole food item). Likewise if the handler defends the item and wins an 469 
AGG fight it retains the whole item. It also follows that if a searcher attacks AGG and the 470 
handler surrenders, the attacker obtains the whole food item without a fight. So the gain for 471 
winning an AGG fight is 1 × 𝛼 = 𝛼 (where 𝛼 is the probability of the attacker winning the 472 
fight as defined in Table 2).   473 
In contrast, if a forager attacks using ST and wins the assumption is made that it 474 
obtains only a portion of the food item contested if the handler defends, and the handler 475 
retains the remaining portion. This assumption exists because this strategy is a sneaky 476 
strategy that involved less of an interaction between forager and handler but often resulted in 477 
the attacker obtaining only a portion (𝑥) of the food item (Table 2). So the gain for the 478 
attacker from winning a stealth fight is 𝑥 × 𝛽 =  𝛽𝑥, where 𝑥 is some portion less than 1, and 479 
the proportion retained by the resisting handler even if it loses is: 𝛽(1 − 𝑥). If the forager 480 
attacks ST and loses then the handler retains the whole of the food item, and similarly if the 481 
forager attacks ST and the handler surrenders then the forager obtains the whole food item.  482 
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The value of food items was measured in the way described because the field data for 483 
foraging behaviour at Billingsgate was collected using observational methods, so there was 484 
no way to directly measure the calorific value of different food items. The sizes of items in 485 
the environment also could not be controlled by the researcher. This limitation of the 486 
observational field methods meant that differences in the size and value of food items could 487 
not be accurately quantified but the method described above reduced the need to know these 488 
dimensions by assessing contested items as one unit of food that was either wholly or partly 489 
obtained. The food items at Billingsgate, being anthropogenic waste and seafood discards, are 490 
significantly larger than the food items found at coastal foraging sites (Spencer et al. 2017). 491 
This abundance of larger items meant the majority of food items at Billingsgate were big 492 
enough to make them candidates for kleptoparasitic attempts so none of the resources at 493 
Billingsgate were excluded from the model as being too small for kleptoparasitism.  494 
In effect food items could be repeatedly stolen on multiple occasions; this requires 495 
some clarification of how potentially smaller and smaller items of food that have experienced 496 
some handling were treated, particularly in relation to ST kleptoparasitism where only 497 
portions of the food item are obtained. The assumption made in the model is that an item of 498 
food has the value of one whole food item regardless of whether it has previously been stolen 499 
or been part of a larger item of food. If a forager sees fit to challenge for the item then it is 500 
treated as one unit of food. It will be noted that this is akin to assuming that food items cannot 501 
be stolen multiple times and are only subject to one kleptoparasitic attempt, after which they 502 
are immediately consumed by the kleptoparasite or handler. The validity of this assumption 503 
was investigated by comparing the simplest cases possible in the population involving partial 504 
food items: whether a handler should resist against ST when attacked by a mutant 505 
kleptoparasite in a population that does not use kleptoparasitism. It was found that the 506 
conditions when it was optimal to resist were the same regardless of whether the 507 
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kleptoparasitic incident was the first attempt or a subsequent attempt to steal the food. This 508 
indicated that it was valid to treat each food item as one unit of food regardless of previous 509 
handling or whether it had been subject to previous kleptoparasitic attempts (Appendix B).  510 
A further assumption of the model, mentioned previously, is that the duration of an 511 
AGG fight (𝑡𝑎 2⁄ ) is on average longer than the duration of a ST fight (𝑡𝑐 2⁄ ). So, an ST fight 512 
is less protracted and has a lower time cost but results in a lower payoff in terms of the 513 
portion of the food item gained on average by the attacker. This makes ST a less risky and 514 
less time costly strategy but one with a lower payoff than AGG when both strategies are 515 
successful.  516 
The behavioural strategies being used by the population as a whole need to be 517 
considered when trying to identify when it is advantageous for a searcher to use 518 
kleptoparasitism or for a handler to defend/ resist against kleptoparasitic attacks. In the 519 
population being modelled the various population dynamics that are possible result in twelve 520 
situations that need to be considered to identify advantageous conditions for searchers to 521 
attack and handlers to defend/ resist.  522 
Searchers: 523 
Following Broom & Ruxton (1998) and Broom et al. (2004), to assess when it is 524 
advantageous for a searcher to attack a handler it is sufficient to consider the instantaneous 525 
rate at which a searcher becomes a handler after encountering a handler. When a searcher 526 
encounters a handler it must decide whether to ignore the handler and continue searching for 527 
food items or attack the handler using either AGG or ST. The strategy it should use is the one 528 
that minimises the amount of time until it becomes the handler of a food item. This is the 529 
strategy that maximises the forager’s rate of gain per time foraging. If it ignores the handler 530 
then it is just a searcher and has a rate of gain of 𝑣𝑓𝑓; if it attacks it has a rate of gain that is 531 
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influenced by the time costs of the fight and, if it loses, the rate at which it finds other food 532 
items or handlers to challenge. The rates at which other food items or handlers are found and 533 
challenged by foragers are given by the foraging pathways 𝑇𝑠 for AGG attackers (Figure 3) 534 
and 𝑇𝑠
∗
 for ST attackers (Figure 4). In this model the following situations need to be 535 
considered when a searcher encounters a handler: 536 
When it is advantageous to attack, when the population resists/defends against attacks.  537 
1. When to use AGG (handler defends & population defends). 538 
2. When to use ST (handler resists & population resists).  539 
When it is advantageous not to attack the handler: 540 
3. When to ignore the handler and continue searching for food (population defends/ 541 
resists). 542 
When to attack if the population does not resist/defend against attacks.  543 
4. Searcher should always attack and the kleptoparasitic strategy used does not matter as 544 
both AGG and ST have the same payoff when the population surrenders. Both 545 
strategies obtain 1 whole food item.  546 
 
 
Handlers: 547 
When a handler is discovered by a searcher and attacked it can choose either to resist/defend 548 
the food item it is handling or surrender the item and resume searching for a new food item. 549 
The strategy it should use is the one that minimises the amount of time until it resumes 550 
handling a food item. If it resists/ defends the food item the time to resume handling is 551 
influenced by the duration of the fight and if it loses, the rate at which it encounters other 552 
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food items or handlers to challenge, as stated above this search path is denoted by 𝑇𝑠 𝑜𝑟 𝑇𝑠
∗
 553 
(Figures 3 and 4), which shows the time to acquire a food item from the start of searching. 554 
Likewise if it surrenders the food item it becomes a searcher again and resumes handling at 555 
the rate at which it finds a new food item or encounters another handler and successfully 556 
challenges them, again 𝑇𝑠 𝑜𝑟 𝑇𝑠
∗
. The following situations need to be considered when a 557 
handler is discovered by a searcher: 558 
When it is advantageous for a handler to resist/defend in a population where searchers attack 559 
and the rest of the handling population resists/defends: 560 
5. When to defend against AGG (population defends and handler’s searching strategy is 561 
AGG).  562 
6. When to defend against AGG (population defends and handler’s searching strategy is 563 
ST).  564 
7. When to resist against ST (population resists and handler’s searching strategy is ST). 565 
8. When to resist against ST (population resists and handler’s searching strategy is 566 
AGG).   567 
When it is advantageous for a handler to resist/defend in a population where searchers attack 568 
and the rest of the handling population does not resist:  569 
9. When to defend against AGG (population surrenders).  570 
10. When to resist against ST (population surrenders). 571 
(In these two cases the handler’s searching pathways are identical as the payoff for 572 
both AGG and ST is equal when the population surrenders food items. 𝑇𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑇𝑠
∗
 573 
simplify to 1/(𝑣𝑓𝑓 + 𝑣ℎ𝐻). 574 
When it is advantageous for a handler to resist/defend in a population where searchers do not 575 
attack but the forager is attacked by a mutant challenger: 576 
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11. When to defend AGG against a mutant AGG challenger. 577 
12. When to resist ST against a mutant ST challenger.  578 
(In these two cases the handler’s searching pathways are identical as the population 579 
does not attack, so all individuals acquire food at the rate 𝑣𝑓𝑓. The simplification of 580 
𝑇𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑇𝑠
∗
 to this rate is given by   1/𝑣𝑓𝑓. 581 
INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 582 
INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE 583 
 
Working through situations 1-12 in turn results in a series of inequality conditions for 584 
a forager’s behaviour to be advantageous against the background population strategies 585 
described. These conditions outlining when the use of kleptoparasitism by a searcher and 586 
defending/ resisting against kleptoparasitism by a handler are optimal strategies are 587 
summarised in Table 3 (column 4) and are labelled A1a – A10 (Table 3, column 5). 588 
Appendix C outlines the steps by which conditions A1a – A10 were derived.  589 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 590 
Stage 3: Candidate evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS’s):  591 
To fully specify the behaviour of foragers in the population we must consider what decisions 592 
they make at the three decision points described by the four probabilities shown in Table 2, 593 
that is, the probability with which they attack AGG (𝑝1) together with the probability with 594 
which they attack ST (𝑝2) (recall that this is a single decision point with 𝑝1 + 𝑝2 ≤ 1), the 595 
probability with which a forager defends against AGG (𝑝3) and the probability with which 596 
they defend against ST (𝑝4). Following Hadjichrysanthou and Broom (2012), if the 597 
population is at or near to an equilibrium and all members follow strategy profile 598 
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(𝑝1, 𝑝2, 𝑝3, 𝑝4) that population can be invaded by foragers that use a different foraging 599 
strategy which results in a higher food consumption rate, as this would translate into a higher 600 
fitness payoff for those foragers. To consider whether a mutant playing a slightly different 601 
strategy to the rest of the population can invade the population playing strategy profile 602 
(𝑝1, 𝑝2, 𝑝3, 𝑝4) it is sufficient to consider whether the mutant uses a different strategy at any 603 
one of the three decision points. A different strategy at any one decision point that gives a 604 
higher payoff will result in an overall higher payoff for the mutant and it is sufficient to 605 
consider differences in pure strategies at each of the three decision points. Hadjichrysanthou 606 
and Broom (2012) provided proofs for some generic parameters and conducted extensive 607 
numerical investigation of why there are no mixed-strategy ESS’s. Following those 608 
arguments, consideration of the use of only pure strategies in this model means that the 609 
searcher will either always use AGG, always use ST, or always ignore the opportunity to 610 
attack. The working assumption in the current model therefore is that there are twelve 611 
candidates for pure strategy ESS’s that need to be considered as outlined below. Here the four 612 
probabilities (𝑝1, 𝑝2, 𝑝3, 𝑝4) take the value 1 or 0, meaning the associated behaviour is always 613 
used (1) or never used (0), respectively.  614 
- Strategy (1,0,1,0) (AGG Defender): The forager always attacks AGG and always 615 
defends against AGG, but never uses or resists against ST.  616 
- Strategy (0,1,0,1) (ST Resistor): The forager always attacks ST and always resists ST 617 
attacks, but never uses or defends against AGG.  618 
- Strategy (1,0,0,1) (AGG Resistor): The forager always attacks AGG but only ever 619 
resists against ST attacks.  620 
- Strategy (1,0,0,0) (AGG Marauder): The forager always attacks AGG but never 621 
resists or defends against attack.  622 
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- Strategy (0,1,1,0) (ST Defender): The forager always attacks ST and only defends 623 
against AGG.  624 
- Strategy (0,1,0,0) (ST Marauder): The forager always attacks ST but never resists or 625 
defends against attacks.  626 
- Strategy (1,0,1,1) (AGG Hawk): The forager always attacks AGG and always defends 627 
and resists against both types of attack.  628 
- Strategy (0,1,1,1) (ST Hawk): The forager always attacks ST and always defends and 629 
resists against both types of attack.  630 
- Strategy (0,0,1,1) (Retaliator): The forager never attacks but it always defends and 631 
resists against both types of attack.  632 
- Strategy (0,0,0,0) (Dove): The forager always searches for its own food, it never 633 
attacks and never defends or resists.  634 
- Strategy (0,0,0,1) (ST Retaliator): The forager never attacks using either strategy and 635 
never defends against AGG but always resists against ST.  636 
- Strategy (0,0,1,0) (AGG Retaliator): The forager never attacks using either strategy, it 637 
always defends against AGG but never against ST attacks.   638 
The twelve possible strategies listed will be evolutionarily stable (ESS’s) when different 639 
combinations of the conditions A1a to A10 (Table 3) are met. The combinations of 640 
conditions that result in a strategy being an ESS are shown in Table 4. Where an asterisk is 641 
shown there are no conditions in which the strategy is evolutionarily stable and a population 642 
using that strategy can always be invaded by a mutant playing a different strategy.   643 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 644 
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Results 645 
Fieldwork results: 646 
Population size and composition: The population at Billingsgate had a mean daily size of 40 647 
(Range: 29, 53; standard deviation: ~8) gulls. Foraging patches consisted of a mean of 12 648 
gulls (Range: 9, 20; standard deviation: ~3). A comparison was made of whether the 649 
proportions of each species engaged in foraging differed from the proportion of each species 650 
in the population as a whole, using headcounts for the total population and headcounts at 651 
patches. This comparison showed a great deal of correspondence between the composition of 652 
the total population and the composition of foraging patches (Population Composition: GBB 653 
11%, HG 70%, BHG 19%; Foraging Patch Composition: GBB 12%, HG 72%, BHG: 16%), 654 
which provided some reassurance regarding the stability of the population. As the 655 
kleptoparasitic behaviours of interest occurred within foraging patches, the data obtained 656 
from patches were used for analyses.   657 
Kleptoparasitism: Kleptoparasitic interactions were recorded in 112/183 foraging patches at 658 
Billingsgate. This gives a ratio of 61% of patches where at least one kleptoparasitic attack 659 
occurred and 39% of patches where no kleptoparasitism was observed. A total of 577 660 
kleptoparasitic incidents were recorded at Billingsgate, 362 (63%) of these occurrences were 661 
AGG kleptoparasitism and 215 (37%) were instances of ST kleptoparasitism. The success 662 
rates for the use of these strategies were AGG: 286/362 = 79% and ST 152/215 = 71%.  663 
 Analysis of host responses to kleptoparasitism showed that on average the population 664 
defended 45% of the time and surrendered 55% of the time. By strategy the population 665 
defended against AGG for 73/209 (35%) attacks and resisted against ST on 72/112 (64%) of 666 
occasions.   667 
31 
 
Foraging: Foraging patch videos were analysed to assess how many times foragers sampled 668 
for food and how often they obtained food items. The total number of foragers at Billingsgate 669 
recorded over all foraging patches was 2327. Analyses showed that these foragers sampled 670 
but didn’t obtain food on 5605 occasions and sampled and acquired food items on 1641 671 
occasions. These behaviours mirror the foraging behaviours of interest outlined in this model 672 
(Figure 2) where individuals sampling are searchers and individuals acquiring a food item are 673 
handlers. Foraging behaviour at Billingsgate can be summarised as: searchers 5605 (~71%), 674 
handlers 1641 (~21%) and kleptoparasitism 577 (~8%).  675 
Analysis and treatment of Billingsgate foraging data (Obtaining values for the model): 676 
The data from Billingsgate provided values for a number of the model parameters and 677 
strategies. The probability of an attacker winning a fight was given by the mean success rate 678 
of each kleptoparasitic strategy in the population. This was 79% for AGG giving a 679 
probability of success (𝛼) of 0.79, and 71% for ST giving a success probability (𝛽) of 0.71. 680 
The rate at which food was discovered at Billingsgate was calculated as the total number of 681 
items discovered divided by the total number of foragers. This gave a mean rate at which 682 
food items were discovered (𝑣𝑓𝑓) as 0.71 items per forager per minute. The rate at which 683 
foragers searched for handlers (𝑣ℎ) was calculated as the rate at which foragers were 684 
discovered to challenge as a proportion of the rate at which food items were discovered, this 685 
returned a value of 0.83 per minute.   686 
To calculate the probability of a searcher using a kleptoparasitic strategy, either 687 
attacking AGG or ST upon discovering a handler, (𝑝1) and (𝑝2) respectively, it was 688 
necessary to find some way of accounting for the proportion of occasions that foragers 689 
ignored a handler and continued searching for food items, as there is no direct way of 690 
knowing whether a searcher had the opportunity to attack and did not it was necessary to 691 
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estimate ignored opportunities. This was done using the percentage of foraging patches where 692 
no kleptoparasitism occurred as a measure of ignored opportunities. Kleptoparasitism was 693 
possible in all foraging patches and the percentage of patches where no kleptoparasitism took 694 
place, 39% of patches, was viewed as a crude index of the rate at which foragers ignored 695 
opportunities to steal. The probability that a searcher attacked using either AGG or ST was 696 
then calculated by multiplying the percentage with which the particular kleptoparasitic 697 
strategy was used by the percentage of patches within which kleptoparasitism occurred 698 
(61%). This gave a probability of attacking AGG (𝑝1) of 0.38 and the probability of attacking 699 
ST (𝑝2) of 0.23. The probability that a handler defended (𝑝3) or resisted (𝑝4) was simply the 700 
proportion of attacks recorded at Billingsgate where the handler defended or resisted. 701 
Handlers at Billingsgate defended against AGG 35% of the time making 𝑝3 0.35 and resisted 702 
against ST 64% of the time making 𝑝4 0.64.  703 
 Values were unknown for three parameters that were approximated using exponential 704 
probability distributions: mean handling time (𝑡ℎ), mean ST fight duration (𝑡𝑐), and mean 705 
AGG fight duration (𝑡𝑎). Plausible values for these parameters were investigated numerically 706 
using the solutions for the density of each behavioural compartment in the population at 707 
equilibrium and the known parameter values and behavioural compartment densities from the 708 
foraging data for Billingsgate. Table 5 summarises the parameter values and probabilities for 709 
strategy use in the Billingsgate population that were inputted into the model to investigate 710 
equilibrium densities of behaviours.  711 
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 712 
The densities of behaviours in the population were obtained from the real foraging 713 
data for Billingsgate. The mean patch size at Billingsgate was 12 birds per patch. The data 714 
showed that on average the densities of individuals in each behavioural category were: 71% 715 
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searchers (𝑆) (this equates to ~8.52 birds/patch), 21% handlers (𝐻) (~2.52 birds/patch) and 716 
8% were engaged in kleptoparasitic fights over food (~0.96 birds/patch). As previously stated 717 
63% of the observed fights at Billingsgate involved AGG and 37% were ST fights. This gives 718 
values of approximately 0.6 birds per patch engaged in AGG fights and 0.36 birds per patch 719 
engaged in ST fights. As fights involved exactly one kleptoparasite and host, the ~0.6 birds 720 
engaged in AGG fights is split 50:50 between aggressive attackers (𝐴) (~0.3 birds/patch) and 721 
defenders (𝐷) (~0.3 birds/patch) and the remaining ~0.36 birds engaged in ST is split 50:50 722 
between stealth attackers (𝐶) (~0.18 birds/patch) and resistors (𝑅) (~0.18 birds/patch).  723 
Testing for equilibrium densities: 724 
The parameter values listed in Table 5 were used to investigate whether the density of 725 
individuals that occurred in behavioural compartments at Billingsgate could be at an 726 
equilibrium. Numerical investigation showed that in order for the densities of individuals 727 
observed in the foraging population at Billingsgate (Table 6, column 3) to be at an 728 
equilibrium, using the known parameter values and strategy probabilities for that population, 729 
then the mean handling time for food items (𝑡ℎ), mean duration of ST fights (𝑡𝑐) and mean 730 
duration of AGG fights (𝑡𝑎) per minute would be: 𝑡ℎ = 0.42, 𝑡𝑐 = 0.14, 𝑡𝑎 = 0.26. Appendix 731 
D outlines detailed algebraic solutions that gave the parameter values for 𝑡ℎ, 𝑡𝑐 and 𝑡𝑎.   732 
Assuming a foraging population of 12 individuals at patches, the above values for 𝑡ℎ, 733 
𝑡𝑐, and 𝑡𝑎 along with the parameter values shown in Table 5, were inputted into equations 9, 734 
10, 11, 12, 13 and 17. The quadratic formula (17) giving the equilibrium number of handlers 735 
was solved first, followed by 9 giving the equilibrium number of searchers and then 10, 11, 736 
12 and 13 giving the equilibrium number of ST attackers, resistors, AGG attackers and 737 
defenders respectively. The solutions resulted in equilibrium densities close to the densities 738 
of individuals in each compartment observed in the Billingsgate population (Table 6).  739 
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INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 740 
The results in Table 6 for parameter values 𝑡ℎ = 0.42, 𝑡𝑐 = 0.14, 𝑡𝑎 = 0.26 not only 741 
gave equilibrium densities close to the densities observed in the Billingsgate foraging 742 
population but returned ratios of AGG to ST in line with the rates with which these strategies 743 
were used by foragers at Billingsgate. This indicated that the duration of an ST fight to an 744 
AGG fight, at the values of 𝑡ℎ, 𝑡𝑐 and  𝑡𝑎 identified through numerical investigation, 745 
accurately captured the ratio of these two strategies in the real foraging population, this being 746 
that the mean duration of an AGG fight was nearly twice that of an ST fight.  747 
Ecological conditions for ESS’s: 748 
An investigation of the regions of parameter space where each of the candidate ESS’s shown 749 
in Table 4 occur was conducted. Each ESS occurs when a system of inequalities made up by 750 
various combinations of conditions A1a to A10 are satisfied (Table 4). Varying the values of 751 
different ecological parameters contained in the inequalities had a direct influence on when 752 
those inequalities were satisfied. Although all of conditions A1a to A10 were strict 753 
inequalities, the boundary conditions where they are satisfied were obtained by setting the left 754 
and right-hand sides of the inequalities equal to each other.  755 
The values for parameters obtained from the Billingsgate data and the values for 𝑡ℎ, 756 
𝑡𝑐, and 𝑡𝑎, described in the above section, were used in this analysis. Two parameters were 757 
allowed to vary when investigating the ecological conditions in which the ESS’s occur. These 758 
were the rate at which foragers find food (𝑣𝑓𝑓) and the total number of individuals in 759 
foraging patches (P) (Table 7).  760 
INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 761 
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These varied parameters were plotted on a Cartesian plane to create a visual 762 
parameter space of ESS’s for different values of the two ecological conditions. None of the 763 
inequalities (A1a – A10) explicitly contain the parameter P. Values for P were obtained by 764 
substituting equation 17 for H in conditions A3 to A8. These were then solved for P using 765 
Wolfram Alpha mathematical software (Wolfram Alpha©, 2016). Conditions A1a, A1b, A1c, 766 
A2, A9 and A10 do not contain the variable H. These inequalities were solved using the 767 
known values from the data recorded at Billingsgate for the various parameters making up 768 
those inequalities, this gave a value of 𝑣𝑓𝑓 for all P values.  769 
Inputting the real data from Billingsgate into the inequality conditions revealed that 5 770 
of the remaining 7 candidate ESS’s shown in Table 4 were actually possible in the parameter 771 
space of the Billingsgate environment. These 5 strategies were AGG Resistor, AGG 772 
Marauder, ST Marauder, AGG Hawk and ST Hawk. It was found that there were no regions 773 
of the foraging parameter space at Billingsgate where all the inequality conditions for the 774 
other two ESS candidates (ST Defender and Retaliator) were met, indicating that, although 775 
they were possible as ESS’s, for the values of ecological parameters occurring at Billingsgate 776 
they were not ESS strategies. For the Retaliator strategy this may be explained by the fact 777 
that the probability of success for both AGG and ST, 𝛼 and 𝛽 respectively, were very high at 778 
Billingsgate (𝛼 = 0.79, 𝛽 = 0.71) making some sort of attacking strategy worthwhile.  779 
The inequality conditions that were set as equations and solved for P, described 780 
above, were plotted as boundary conditions in foraging parameter space using MATLAB 781 
(Mathworks©, version R2015b). The regions of parameter space occupied by the five ESS 782 
strategies for Billingsgate are shown in Figure 5.  783 
INSERT FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE 784 
Comparing strategy use at Billingsgate with ecological conditions for ESS’s: 785 
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A total of 189 focal animal observations were completed, as far as could be ascertained these 786 
were conducted on 189 different birds (HG: 102; GBB: 57; BHG: 30). As these focal animal 787 
analyses were observations of wild foraging birds there was considerable variation in how 788 
long a bird could be observed before it was lost from view. The duration for which an 789 
individual was observed was recorded in seconds and varied from 3 seconds to 650 seconds 790 
(Range: 647). A Shapiro Wilk test of normality on the data for duration of focal animal 791 
observations showed that it was significantly non-normally distributed (W=0.76, p<0.001), so 792 
the median of 60 seconds was the measure of central tendency that probably best reflected the 793 
duration of the focal animal observations conducted.  794 
Successfully attributing a strategy to an individual forager required the observation of 795 
interactions by that forager as both a searcher and handler. For a strategy where the forager 796 
never engages in a type of behaviour, such as Retaliator where the searcher never attacks, a 797 
minimum observation period of 300 seconds was used. This was viewed as a sufficiently long 798 
period of time to allow the focal animal’s behaviour to be observed in multiple interactions. 799 
None of the individuals observed met this threshold for duration so strategies such as Dove or 800 
Retaliator were not attributed to any birds. As neither of these strategies are ESS’s in the 801 
ecological conditions at Billingsgate this was essentially a moot point but is reported here as 802 
it formed part of the method used for attributing strategies. From the 189 observations 803 
conducted it was possible to confidently attribute a strategy to 52 foragers. The strategies 804 
used by these 52 foragers were considered against the ecological conditions (rate of food 805 
discovery (𝑣𝑓𝑓) and population density (𝑃)) in the patches in which they were observed. This 806 
permitted the strategies of our 52 individual foragers to be plotted against ecological 807 
conditions in the parameter space described for Billingsgate in Figure 5.    808 
All of the five strategies that could possibly be ESS’s at Billingsgate were recorded 809 
from the focal animal observations. Of the 52 foragers attributed strategies it was found that 810 
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12 of those foragers were using strategies in the correct region of parameter space to make 811 
them ESS strategies and 40 foragers were using their strategies in non-ESS regions of 812 
parameter space; thus  ~23% of foragers were making optimal foraging decisions and 813 
individually using an ESS strategy. Figure 6 shows the ESS foraging strategies plotted in 814 
parameter space and Figure 7 shows the location of the foraging strategies used in non-ESS 815 
regions of parameter space.  816 
INSERT FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE 817 
INSERT FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE 818 
 Considerable variation was seen between strategies in the rates with which they were 819 
used and the rates with which those strategies were correctly and incorrectly used. Of the 52 820 
foragers to whom strategies could be attributed, ST Hawk (SH) was the least used strategy 821 
being used on only 2 occasions. The most used strategy was AGG Marauder (AM). This 822 
strategy was used on 22 occasions. AGG Resistor (AR), ST Marauder (SM) and AGG Hawk 823 
(AH) were each observed 9, 10 and 9 times respectively. 824 
 The Marauder strategies (AGG Marauder and ST Marauder) were the strategies used 825 
least effectively by foragers, on all occasions these were observed being used in areas of 826 
parameter space where they were not an ESS strategy. In most of these cases (AM: 14; SM: 827 
10) these strategies occurred in the region of parameter space where AGG Hawk and ST 828 
Hawk were ESS’s, indicating that foragers using Marauder strategies were correctly attacking 829 
handlers using AGG or ST, but not defending their food items when attacked in a region of 830 
parameter space where food was scarce and defensive strategies were optimal. 831 
 AGG Resistor was used in an ESS region on one occasion and in a non-ESS region on 832 
8 occasions. All observations of AGG Resistor in a non-ESS region also occurred in the 833 
region where AGG Hawk and ST Hawk were the ESS’s. Foragers using this strategy 834 
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appeared to make the error of not defending against AGG attacks by other foragers, despite 835 
attacking AGG and resisting against ST. 836 
Hawk strategies were used most effectively by foragers. ST Hawk and AGG Hawk 837 
were used in the correct regions of parameter space in which they were ESS’s on all 838 
occasions (SH: 2; AH: 9), indicating that individuals using these strategies were making 839 
optimal foraging decisions given the environmental conditions in which they found 840 
themselves. Table 8 shows the frequencies with which strategies were used in ESS and non-841 
ESS regions of parameter space. 842 
Although not considered explicitly in the model the breakdown of strategy use by 843 
species showed that all 12 of the strategies used correctly were used by the larger gull 844 
species, HG and GBB. It was possible to attribute strategies to 24 GBB, 26 HG and only 2 845 
BHG. The results showed that 25% of GBB (6/24 individuals) were using an ESS, 23% of 846 
HG (6/26 individuals) were using an ESS, and neither of the smaller BHG used an ESS.  847 
INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE 848 
 
 
Discussion 849 
This model was developed to try and capture the kleptoparasitic behaviours of a population of 850 
foraging gulls at Billingsgate Market and to investigate what the model could tell us about the 851 
optimality and stability of the behavioural decisions made by individuals in that population. 852 
This was pursued in two ways: 1. By considering the density of individuals engaged in each 853 
behaviour of interest in the population and investigating the possibility that these behaviours 854 
were at equilibrium densities. 2. Through assessing the optimality of the behavioural 855 
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decisions of individual foragers when compared against the ecological conditions in the 856 
patches in which they were foraging. Were foragers using ESS strategies?  857 
Equilibrium densities: The values of a number of the model parameters were known from the 858 
real foraging behaviour at Billingsgate. The values for handling time (𝑡ℎ), ST fight duration 859 
(𝑡𝑐) and AGG fight duration (𝑡𝑎) were unknown and were varied to investigate numerically at 860 
what values of these parameters the model produced equilibrium densities that matched the 861 
densities of behaviours observed at Billingsgate. The values arrived at were: 𝑡ℎ=0.42, 862 
𝑡𝑐=0.14, 𝑡𝑎=0.26 minutes. The important question to ask about these values is whether they 863 
are plausible values for the parameters they represent.  864 
 Considering first the fight duration variables 𝑡𝑐 and 𝑡𝑎. At the reported values the 865 
duration of an AGG fight (𝑡𝑎) was twice that of an ST fight (𝑡𝑐). This fits with our 866 
understanding of these two kleptoparasitic strategies. Stealth kleptoparasitism by definition is 867 
a sneaky strategy that involves less of an interaction between attacker and handler (Giraldeau 868 
& Caraco, 2000; Vollrath, 1984) and in many cases that interaction was over before the 869 
handler could respond effectively and escalate to a protracted fight. In contrast AGG as a 870 
strategy actually required the attacker to engage in a fight with the handler to try and take the 871 
food item by force. In light of this, the finding that the duration of an AGG fight was twice 872 
that of an ST fight was reasonable and the fact that the values that produced the equilibrium 873 
densities (𝑡𝑐=0.14, 𝑡𝑎=0.26) delivered the correct ratio of AGG (~65%) to ST (~35%) as 874 
observed in the Billingsgate population was reassuring.  875 
 When considering whether these values accurately represent the mean duration of 876 
fights within the Billingsgate population it was noted that fights at Billingsgate, even AGG 877 
fights, whilst variable, were on average short in duration. We estimated from field 878 
observations that ST fights had mean duration of approximately 5 seconds and AGG fights 879 
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had mean duration of just under 10 seconds. However, we did not rely on these estimates as 880 
they were obtained during fieldwork by glancing at a wristwatch and making a quick note for 881 
an opportunistic sample of incidents, essentially those in close proximity to the observer, 882 
when other recording tasks permitted.  883 
Later analysis of foraging videos proved no more effective at providing reliable 884 
estimates of fight duration. There was a large amount of aggression between individuals in 885 
this population and numerous fights, most of which were unrelated to kleptoparasitism. 886 
Fights relating to kleptoparasitic incidents frequently overlapped with and were lost in the 887 
melee of more general aggressive interactions in and around foraging patches. An example of 888 
this we termed “jockeying for position”, which was often seen in patches where a dominant 889 
individual, such as a large GBB, had taken control of a significant item of food. Rather than 890 
challenge the individual for the item a number of birds would fight amongst themselves, 891 
apparently seeking to stay close to the handler waiting for them to finish with and discard the 892 
item. Whilst it was often possible to identify kleptoparasitic attempts on the handler in these 893 
situations accurately keeping track of the individuals for the full duration of the 894 
kleptoparasitic fight in the surrounding melee proved difficult. For this reason we treated 895 
AGG and ST fight duration as unknown variables and followed the approach of investigating 896 
them numerically. When considered as proportions of a minute, the values arrived at through 897 
numerical investigation would make ST fights approximately 4 seconds (𝑡𝑐 2⁄ × 60 = 0.07 ×898 
60) and AGG fights approximately 8 seconds (𝑡𝑎 2⁄ × 60 = 0.13 × 60), both of which sit 899 
close to the level we estimated for the duration of these fights.  900 
Over the year of study no significant injuries were sustained by birds engaged in 901 
fights over food. Gulls often sustain injuries whilst fighting and fights can last for a 902 
considerable length of time particularly during the breeding season when they are generally 903 
more aggressive (Tinbergen, 1953; personal obs.). The fact that no observations of injuries 904 
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were made over the period of study at Billingsgate may reflect that, on the whole, there is no 905 
shortage of food at the site so the conditions that would make staying in a lengthy fight a 906 
good economic decision might not have existed. This interpretation would agree with the 907 
short fight durations produced by the model for both strategies.    908 
The value arrived at for mean handling time, 𝑡ℎ=0.42, is considerably longer than the 909 
mean fight durations. This fits with what is known about food resources in the Billingsgate 910 
environment, which contained an abundance of larger food items most of which required 911 
some handling time before they could be consumed. This longer handling time relative to 912 
fight duration also presents the necessary window of opportunity required for a forager to 913 
identify and challenge handlers before they finished handling and consumed food items. We 914 
did not attempt to obtain a comprehensive estimate of the handling time of food items from 915 
the data. There were very many handling episodes, and estimation could be seriously biased 916 
by two key factors. Firstly, the handling time for food items in general includes the time spent 917 
before and after contests for that item; concentrating only on non-contested items would bias 918 
the results. Similarly there was a great deal of variation in the size of food items available at 919 
Billingsgate and thereby the amount of time we might expect these items to be handled. 920 
Using field observations it would be easy to bias an estimate of handling time as long bouts 921 
of handling are more likely to be noticed and smaller handling bouts easily missed. An 922 
analysis of a sample of the data showed a mean handling time of somewhat over 30 seconds. 923 
The value for mean handling time arrived at through numerical investigation, when 924 
considered as a proportion of a minute gives a value of about 25 seconds (0.42 × 60). This 925 
value is a little lower than our crude estimate but not unrealistically so, suggesting the value 926 
𝑡ℎ = 0.42 is plausible and may accurately reflect the mean times for which birds handled 927 
food items.   928 
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 Using the values for 𝑡ℎ, 𝑡𝑐 and 𝑡𝑎 to accurately draw conclusions about whether the 929 
densities of behavioural compartments at Billingsgate were at an equilibrium depends on 930 
whether the system of dynamical equations, set out in the model (equations 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 931 
7), included and captured all variables that influenced behaviour in that environment. As 932 
stated in the introduction, the lack of competitor species and other trophic levels at 933 
Billingsgate made it a good natural laboratory in which to try and meet the simplifying 934 
assumptions needed for a mathematical model. None of the values arrived at by numerical 935 
investigation were at unrealistic levels and the differences between 𝑡𝑐 and 𝑡𝑎 accurately 936 
captured the ratio of AGG to ST use at Billingsgate, meaning the model may provide a good 937 
approximation of the densities of behaviours seen in the real foraging population.  938 
 The fact that there has been a foraging population at this site since the early 1980’s 939 
and over that time the population, and the availability and scheduling of food, is likely to 940 
have remained relatively stable makes it a realistic possibility that the population may have 941 
settled at some equilibrium of searchers to handlers to individuals involved in kleptoparasitic 942 
interactions. The model developed and tested here has improved our understanding of and 943 
accurately described the density of behaviours in the Billingsgate foraging population.  944 
Use of ESS strategies: The focal animal analyses conducted to assess individual use of ESS’s 945 
showed that all five of the ESS’s that were possible at Billingsgate were actually observed in 946 
the foraging population. The fact that these were exactly the five strategies we observed is 947 
notable given that there are potentially 12 different strategies (Table 4) available to a 948 
population that can utilise the kleptoparasitic behaviours we modelled here. The presence of 949 
multiple strategies in the population adds a further strand of support to research showing that 950 
kleptoparasitism in gull species is a flexible foraging strategy and a facultative response to 951 
changing environmental conditions (Maniscalco & Ostrand, 1997; Spencer et al. 2017).  952 
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Further, these five strategies involved two of the types of kleptoparasitism described 953 
by Giraldeau & Caraco (2000) (Stealth and Aggressive). Our data has demonstrated the use 954 
of more than one of these kleptoparasitism types within species in the Billingsgate 955 
population. Although other research has established the existence of these different types of 956 
kleptoparasitism through their individual use by a species (e.g. Aggressive: Bald Eagles 957 
Haliaeetus leucocephalus (Hansen, 1986); Stealth: Eastern chipmunks Tamias striatus 958 
(Elliott, 1978)) no work has given particular focus to the presence of more than one of these 959 
kleptoparasitism types in a single population. We hope that the way we have recorded and 960 
analysed these behaviours has added some value to the literature for those interested in 961 
investigating how the ability to use multiple types of kleptoparasitism influences behavioural 962 
dynamics.    963 
When distinguishing which of the five possible ESS strategies to use in different 964 
environmental conditions, we found that 23% of the foragers to whom strategies could be 965 
attributed were actually playing an ESS. This seems to indicate that gulls at Billingsgate were 966 
on the whole not making good behavioural decisions. There are, however, a number of 967 
possible explanations for this result.  968 
 First, time was used to model all the costs of the different foraging activities in this 969 
population. The model assumed we can ignore the potential energetic and injury costs of 970 
different kleptoparasitic strategies. The results showed that gulls were using Marauder 971 
strategies more than predicted by the model and thereby fighting less than they should have 972 
to match ESS predictions. This suggests that there may be additional costs to fighting beyond 973 
the time costs that were the focus of our model. If we had added an extra penalty to the 974 
model, to represent risk of injury or use of energy, making fighting more costly, this would 975 
have moved the regions of parameter space occupied by different strategies and we may have 976 
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found that more individuals were using ESS strategies in the appropriate environmental 977 
conditions.  978 
Second, as Billingsgate provides a stable and consistent food source, it is possible that 979 
individuals in the population have learned the scheduling and have a good knowledge of 980 
quantities and regularity of food resources at the site. For example, the gulls may have 981 
learned to pay attention to certain cues associated with routines at the site. It was noted that 982 
all the bins are gathered together and washed out at the same time each day and this 983 
frequently generated food patches. In such a case we may conclude that what appeared to be 984 
non-optimal behaviours, of using Marauder strategies in patches where there were few 985 
resources and the model predicted defending food items, may actually reflect knowledge 986 
amongst members of the population of the frequency with which patches appear and an 987 
expectation that resources will not be scarce for long. Indeed, the mean number of patches 988 
per day of fieldwork at Billingsgate was 5.54, indicating that within the hours available to 989 
forage at the market the possibility of further patches appearing was often likely. A logical 990 
conclusion that could be drawn from this line of argument is that behaviour may change over 991 
the course of the day as the daily foraging window of opportunity at this site draws to a close 992 
and further patches become less and less likely. This would match previous findings in the 993 
risk-sensitive foraging literature which have shown that foragers will take greater risks as the 994 
time available to meet their daily energy needs runs out (Caraco et al., 1980). This may result 995 
in riskier aggressive and defensive strategies being more likely later in the day at 996 
Billingsgate. This is not something that was assessed in our model but suggests a potentially 997 
fruitful area for further research. Anecdotally it was noted that the population spends more 998 
time loafing as the morning progresses suggesting there are sufficient resources at the site for 999 
the majority of birds to become satiated, however, this may change seasonally as the energy 1000 
demands of these gulls change.      1001 
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 Third, the one-species approach used to model this population assumed that all 1002 
foragers were essentially identical and that averaging the data for the whole year of study 1003 
would successfully smooth out the influence of competitive asymmetries between individuals 1004 
and between the three study species. The one-species approach was used to keep the model as 1005 
simple as possible and make the necessary mathematics more tractable. The regions of 1006 
parameter space predicted by the model make intuitive sense and agree with previous models 1007 
(Broom et al. 2004; Hadjichrysanthou & Broom, 2012), with ESS regions for Hawk strategies 1008 
in low food availability patches and Marauder strategies in areas of higher food availability 1009 
where defensive behaviour is less necessary as new food items are encountered frequently. 1010 
The model did not fully predict individual foraging decisions. This may be because additional 1011 
factors such as injury and energetic costs, not included in the model, may have influenced 1012 
strategy choice. However, gull species differ considerably in morphology and potentially 1013 
thereby in competitive ability. Despite being frequently found together in mixed-species 1014 
foraging flocks, the three species found at Billingsgate differ considerably in size and 1015 
dominance. GBB and HG are amongst the largest of gull species, being both predatory and 1016 
aggressive with large powerful bills. The BHG in contrast is a much smaller species of gull. 1017 
Beyond the ecological parameters of food discovery rate (𝑣𝑓𝑓) and density of the population 1018 
in a patch (𝑃) that were the focus of this analysis, asymmetries between foragers of the 1019 
different species clearly did affect the foraging decisions made. For example, the more 1020 
aggressive Hawk strategies (AGG Hawk and ST Hawk) were the strategies used effectively 1021 
and played as ESS’s on all occasions. These are likely to be strategies used by the larger, 1022 
more dominant species. In contrast, the Marauder strategies (ST Marauder and AGG 1023 
Marauder) were strategies used in the non-ESS regions of parameter space. These strategies 1024 
were seen most frequently in the region where AGG Hawk and ST Hawk were ESS’s, 1025 
indicating that foragers were failing to defend food items when such behaviour would have 1026 
46 
 
been optimal. What appeared to be sub-optimal behaviour of surrendering food in a region 1027 
where food was scarce and defensive behaviours were predicted by the model, in most cases 1028 
will have been the best behavioural decision for some handlers, given the competitive 1029 
advantages of the bird that was attacking it. For example, due to differences in size and 1030 
strength it would never be optimal for a BHG handler to defend against a GBB or HG, indeed 1031 
the data from Billingsgate showed that BHG never defended when attacked by either of these 1032 
larger species. The asymmetries between these two species are based on size dimorphism and 1033 
are clear for all individuals to see. As argued by Maynard Smith (1982), when individuals are 1034 
aware of asymmetries those asymmetries will affect behaviour. The one-species model 1035 
developed here did not reflect the fact that the optimal behaviour in a given region of 1036 
parameter space would differ between the three study species due to differences in 1037 
competitive ability; and the modelling assumption of only considering pure strategies 1038 
overlooked the fact that the best decision a handler can make may change as a function of the 1039 
species of opponent.  1040 
Mixed strategies were not observed in the focal animal observations conducted. This 1041 
may be because an animal that has a best strategy should use that strategy. However, we 1042 
know from analysis of the patterns of kleptoparasitic behaviour in the data at Billingsgate that 1043 
larger species used AGG against smaller species, smaller species used ST against larger 1044 
species and that gulls used both AGG and ST against conspecifics (75% AGG, 25% ST). 1045 
This leaves a number of possible scenarios: Individuals specialise in one type of 1046 
kleptoparasitism and select their opponents based on this, so the population consists of a mix 1047 
of individuals using pure strategies. Alternatively, individuals use both types of 1048 
kleptoparasitism and will change which one they use based on the competitive ability of their 1049 
opponent. Although this second type was not observed in the focal observations it seems 1050 
likely that there will be individuals in the population that do switch strategies based on 1051 
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opponent. Perhaps none of the focal observations were of sufficiently long duration to 1052 
observe all the necessary interactions to show this. If it had been possible to mark/identify 1053 
individuals, this picture could have been developed by observing individuals across foraging 1054 
patches building up a more comprehensive picture of foraging strategies of individuals. 1055 
Examination of the focal animal data showed that all 12 individuals that correctly used ESS’s 1056 
were larger gull species, either GBB or HG, indicating that the parameter space shown in 1057 
Figure 5 may best capture the ESS regions for more dominant individuals in the population.  1058 
 Despite the above argument, closer examination of the focal animal data showed that 1059 
between GBB and HG these larger species did not differ significantly in their successful use 1060 
of ESS’s, with 25% of GBB and 23% of HG using the correct strategy. The GBB is larger 1061 
and more dominant than the HG, if the regions of parameter space better suit dominant 1062 
individuals we might expect the majority of birds using ESS’s to be GBB, however, this was 1063 
not the case. Individuals of both species ineffectively used Marauder strategies at a high rate 1064 
with 46% of GBB and 73% of HG not defending food items in environmental conditions 1065 
where they should have. The GBB did show a slightly greater tendency to engage in some 1066 
sort of defensive behaviour, with 33% of individuals using the Aggressive Resistor (AR) 1067 
strategy compared to only 4% of HG using this strategy, but the majority of this use (88%) 1068 
was in the wrong region of parameter space. The much smaller BHG used only Marauder 1069 
strategies which fits the argument that competitive differences influenced behaviour, but as it 1070 
was only possible to attribute a strategy to 2 foraging BHG, with so few data points, this adds 1071 
little evidence to support the idea that the parameter space generated by the model depicts 1072 
strategies for dominant individuals.  1073 
 When assessing the amount of error in the model’s ability to predict individual 1074 
behaviour the picture appears to be more complicated than species level differences in 1075 
competitive ability can account for. However, there is a further dimension upon which 1076 
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foragers in this population can differ in competitive ability and that is age-class. Within 1077 
species the foraging abilities of gulls increase with age up to maturity (Verbeek, 1977a; 1078 
Bertellotti & Yorio, 2000). We can expect this dimension to influence behaviour with 1079 
juvenile gulls perhaps investing more in certain types of kleptoparasitic strategies due to their 1080 
lesser competitive abilities or poorer foraging decisions due to inexperience. Juvenile gulls 1081 
made up 48% of the foraging population at Billingsgate, however, juveniles were 1082 
overrepresented in the group of 52 gulls to whom a foraging strategy could be attributed, 1083 
which consisted of 69% juvenile birds. This heavy bias towards juveniles in the population of 1084 
individuals used to assess individual foraging decisions highlights further that the division of 1085 
parameter space regions for Billingsgate may be complex and that the sample of gulls to 1086 
whom a strategy could be attributed to test the model may not generalise to the population as 1087 
a whole.   1088 
 The results indicate that due to competitive differences the regions of ESS parameter 1089 
space will differ between species and possibly by age-class. Rather than foragers at 1090 
Billingsgate making poor foraging decisions it is actually the case that the optimal 1091 
behavioural decision will differ by species and age-class throughout the parameter space and 1092 
as a function of opponent. A more complex model incorporating these factors is required to 1093 
investigate the optimality of individual foraging decisions in the population at Billingsgate.  1094 
 Further, discussion is also required of a more fundamental limitation of the approach 1095 
taken in this research. Values for model parameters were extracted from field data. Using this 1096 
approach it was necessary to find some meaningful way of aggregating field data that 1097 
captured behaviour in the Billingsgate population. This was achieved by working out 1098 
probabilities for certain behaviours based on data for the whole population over the year of 1099 
study. This gave single probabilities for behaviours such as winning fights and attempting 1100 
kleptoparasitic attacks that remained constant. Just as calculating the average for any rate is 1101 
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of limited value in identifying the instantaneous rate at any single point over the period of 1102 
measurement, the method for calculating probabilities for certain behaviours at Billingsgate 1103 
ignored the fact that these probabilities may change with environmental conditions over time. 1104 
The alternative approach would have required generating a model for each of the 183 patches 1105 
recorded. This would have resulted in excessive model fitting when trying to capture 1106 
something general about kleptoparasitism in this population. This limitation is of most 1107 
relevance when considering the behaviours of individual foragers. The parameter estimates 1108 
that generated the regions of parameter space for different ESS’s (Figure 5) will not have 1109 
been appropriate for all foragers; this was certainly true at the level of species and age-class, 1110 
and at the finest level of granularity each forager may have had its own unique parameter 1111 
space division for ESS’s. However, all methods of sampling and data collation result in some 1112 
loss of precision, so, despite these limitations, the approach taken was viewed as a valid way 1113 
to summarise kleptoparasitic behaviours and arrive at parameter estimates for this population 1114 
at the most general level.    1115 
 The application of theoretical models to the behaviour of wild foraging populations is 1116 
a neglected area of research. Empirical work in this area has frequently focused on using 1117 
captive populations of foragers to test the frequency-dependent payoffs predicted by P-S 1118 
models, often using aviary populations of seed-feeding passerines (Giraldeau et al., 1994; 1119 
Mottley & Giraldeau, 2000). Studies using natural populations are rare (Beauchamp, 2014). 1120 
Hansen (1986) settled for a qualitative assessment of the extent to which kleptoparasitic and 1121 
producing strategies matched game-theoretic equilibrium predictions when studying foraging 1122 
interactions between Bald eagles. Work by Beauchamp (2014) went further by assessing 1123 
whether producing and scrounging tactics provided the same mean payoffs in foraging 1124 
aggregations of Semipalmated sandpipers (Calidris pusilla). Behavioural cues of time spent 1125 
exploiting a patch in the Beauchamp (2014) study were used to measure intake, this was used 1126 
50 
 
to calculate payoffs and assess the fitness of different strategies through comparison of time 1127 
spent exploiting produced versus scrounged patches. A comparable approach in our model 1128 
would have been to try to use handling time to calculate payoffs for different strategies 1129 
relative to different sized food items that were stolen. However, in the Billingsgate 1130 
population, birds competed for discrete hard to divide food items where contest times were 1131 
integral to foraging efficiency. As a result the differential equation based method we used, 1132 
whereby minimisation of time costs in acquiring food items was used to compare the fitness 1133 
of behaviours was, we believe, the most practical approach at Billingsgate.  1134 
 Beauchamp (2014) found that scrounging increased when individuals had difficulty 1135 
finding patches and may function to reduce the variance in payoffs they experience. This 1136 
would be an appropriate conclusion for that study system, as sandpipers were exploiting 1137 
highly divisible patches containing numerous minute prey items and kleptoparasitism is 1138 
assumed to be a risk-averse strategy. Our population and model differed from this in that 1139 
there was a finite quantity of only partially divisible food items and gulls had no problem 1140 
locating these food items but all food items were likely to be quickly taken possession of by 1141 
other gulls. The decision to engage in kleptoparasitic behaviour then became a potentially 1142 
risky strategy often involving the cost of having to fight for the item.  1143 
 Research by Morand-Ferron et al., (2007) investigated kleptoparasitism in a wild 1144 
population of Carib grackles (Quiscalus lugubris) by using provisioning studies. Each item of 1145 
food was indivisible and required some handling before it could be exploited and Carib 1146 
grackles used aggressive and stealth kleptoparasitism to obtain these food items. They found 1147 
that scrounging was negatively frequency dependent in line with P-S model predictions, but 1148 
were unable to provide insight into how the use of different types of kleptoparasitism shaped 1149 
patterns of behaviour in their study population. This may be because, with only one study 1150 
species, there was no easy way to discern differences in competitive ability between foragers, 1151 
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so identifying the relationship between how differences in competitive ability influenced the 1152 
use of different types of kleptoparasitism may not have been possible. Our model, by 1153 
considering a population of one species, suffered a similar limitation and further work to 1154 
investigate the dynamics of strategy use and competitive ability, as discussed above, seems 1155 
worthwhile. Mixed-species flocks of gulls provide a good study system for addressing these 1156 
questions as they can use all three of the kleptoparasitism strategies described and differences 1157 
in competitive ability can also be readily identified through size differences between species 1158 
and age differences within species, recognised through plumage.  1159 
 A key aim of our model was to investigate the extent to which it is possible to 1160 
adequately specify the parameters of real populations of foragers and assess the optimality of 1161 
behaviour within those populations. This was achieved through an analysis of the equilibrium 1162 
density of kleptoparasitic behaviours as well as the optimality of individual foraging 1163 
decisions. The results suggest that in populations that can be demarcated, such as the one at 1164 
Billingsgate, applying evolutionary game theory models to study behaviour could be an 1165 
effective research tool. The model reported here proved effective at investigating the 1166 
equilibrium density of different behavioural compartments in the population and in 1167 
identifying the ESS strategies expected to be present in the population. Increasing the 1168 
complexity of this model should further increase its utility for investigating the optimality of 1169 
individual foraging behaviour, so the prospects for applying this modelling approach to real 1170 
foraging populations seem good.  1171 
 This research focused on modelling the behavioural decisions of a population of urban 1172 
gulls. Gull populations in the UK have declined significantly over the last century resulting in 1173 
a number of species being listed as conservation priorities (Eaton et al., 2015). 1174 
Simultaneously gull populations have been growing in urban areas (Rock, 2005) by 1175 
exploiting an abundance of food resources from anthropogenic waste as well as secure nest 1176 
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sites on buildings. This has generated considerable research interest regarding the 1177 
conservation and changing ecology of these species (Scott et al., 2014; Rock & Vaughan, 1178 
2013; Spencer et al., 2017; Ross-Smith et al., 2014). We hope that the research reported here 1179 
will convince researchers of the utility of evolutionary game theory as a tool for investigating 1180 
how good the behavioural decisions of urban gulls are. Knowledge of the optimality of their 1181 
behaviour and foraging abilities will be essential to their conservation and will be important 1182 
in predicting the likely population trajectory of these species.    1183 
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Figure Legends 
 
 
Figure 1. Trader’s Car Park, Billingsgate Market. Boundaries of study area are outlined in 
black. Distances are shown in metres. Image taken from Google maps 24/11/15.   
 
Figure 2. Flow diagram showing the dynamics of the Billingsgate foraging population 
for the single-species model. The arrows show the inflows and outflows of the different 
behavioural compartments and the rates at which these occur are shown along the arrows. 
Rates are given by combinations of the model notation (Table 2). Dashed arrows show the 
rates at which challenged handlers surrender food items without a fight and thereby change 
compartments with searchers.  
 
Figure 3. Searching pathway for an AGG forager. 𝑇𝑠 is the time required, from the start of 
searching, to either find a food item or successfully steal from another handler using AGG. 
Zero (0) indicates the searcher successfully acquires food and exits the searching pathway.  
 
Figure 4. Searching pathway for an ST forager. 𝑇𝑠
∗
 is the time required from the start of 
searching to either find a new food item or successfully steal from another handler using ST. 
Zero (0) indicates the searcher successfully finds food and exits the searching pathway. When 
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successful in using ST the forager still has only acquired a portion 𝑥 of a food item and still 
has a search time of (1 − 𝑥)𝑇𝑠
∗ before it obtains food to the value of a whole food item.   
 
Figure 5. Regions of the foraging parameter space at Billingsgate where each of the 5 
possible ESS’s occurs for different population density values (P) and food discovery 
rates (𝒗𝒇𝒇). The five possible ESS’s represented are AGG Hawk (AH), ST Hawk (SH), 
AGG Resistor (AR), AGG Marauder (AM) and ST Marauder (SM). Lines represent the 
boundaries of parameter space regions where different strategies are ESS’s. Labels for the 
strategies are shown in their ESS region. Note that it is possible for more than one strategy to 
be an ESS in the same region of parameter space and ESS regions for different strategies 
overlap in some cases.  
 
Figure 6. Foraging strategies used in the region of parameter space in which they are 
ESS’s. Each symbol plotted represents one of the 12 foragers making the optimal foraging 
decision. Foragers are depicted by symbols based on the strategy used: AR (O), AH (X), SH 
(#). Lines and labels on the figure show the boundaries for regions where different strategies 
are ESS’s.  
 
Figure 7. Foraging strategies used in the region of parameter space in which they are 
not an ESS. Each symbol represents a forager that is using a strategy other than the ESS 
strategy for that region of parameter space (N=40). Foragers are depicted by symbols based 
on the strategy used: AR (X), AM (O), SM (#).Lines and labels on the figure show the 
boundaries for regions where different strategies are ESS’s.      
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Tables & Table Legends 
 
Table 1. Behaviours constituting strategies of aggressive and stealth kleptoparasitism  
Strategy  Behaviour 
Aggressive Force Kleptoparasite uses of bill to make contact with host’s 
body in order to effect theft. 
Attempt to physically pull or tear food item from host. 
Threat Upright threat posture – Bird stands upright with head 
tilted forward, and holds wings out from body so they 
are clearly defined and no longer partly-concealed by 
the contour feathers of mantle and body (Tinbergen, 
1953).   
Wings spread – Kleptoparasite charges the host with 
wings spread. 
Charge – (BHG only) Kleptoparasite drops its head 
forward, flattens out its body and then charges at the 
host. 
Stealth  Food stolen from the floor in front of the host.  
  Food stolen whilst the host is distracted and not in 
contact with the food item.  
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Table 2. Model notation.  
Population Densities Definition 
𝑃 Density of the total foraging population 
𝑆 Density of searchers 
𝐻 Density of handlers 
𝐴 Density of aggressive kleptoparasites 
𝐷 Density of defenders against aggressive kleptoparasitism 
𝐶 Density of stealth kleptoparasites 
𝑅 Density of resistors against stealth kleptoparasitism 
Model Parameters  
𝑣𝑓𝑓 Rate at which foragers find food items  
𝑣ℎ𝐻 Rate at which searchers encounter handlers  
𝑡ℎ Expected time needed for a handler to consume a food 
item  
𝑡𝑎 2⁄  Expected duration of an aggressive fight 
𝑡𝑐 2⁄  Expected duration of a stealth fight 
𝛼 Probability that the attacker wins an aggressive fight 
𝛽 Probability that the attacker wins a stealth fight 
𝑥 Avg. proportion of a food item obtained using strategy 𝑝2 
Strategies  
𝑝1 Probability that a searcher attacks using aggressive 
kleptoparasitism upon encountering a handler 
𝑝2 Probability that a searcher attacks using stealth 
kleptoparasitism upon encountering a handler 
𝑝3 Probability that a handler attacked using aggressive 
kleptoparasitism defends its food item 
𝑝4 Probability that a handler attacked using stealth 
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kleptoparasitism resists the attack for its food item 
 
 
 
Table 3. Conditions under which it is advantageous to challenge and resist/ defend in 
the model of the Billingsgate population.  
Situation Situation 
Description 
Decision Solution Inequality 
  Searcher   
1 Handler 
defends & 
pop’n defends 
When to use 
AGG? 
2𝛼
𝑡𝑎
> max (
2𝛽𝑥
𝑡𝑐
, 𝑣𝑓𝑓) 
A1a 
2 Handler resists 
& pop’n resists 
When to use 
ST? 
2𝛽𝑥
𝑡𝑐
> max(
2𝛼
𝑡𝑎
, 𝑣𝑓𝑓) A1b 
3 Handler & 
pop’n resists/ 
defends 
When to ignore 
handler 
𝑣𝑓𝑓 > max (
2𝛼
𝑡𝑎
,
2𝛽𝑥
𝑡𝑐
) 
A1c 
4 Handler 
surrenders & 
pop’n 
surrenders 
When to use 
AGG or ST? 
∞ > 𝑣𝑓𝑓 A2 
  Handler   
5 Pop’n defends 
& handler is an 
AGG forager 
When to 
defend against 
AGG? 
𝑣𝑓𝑓 <
2(1 − 𝛼)
𝑡𝑎
+ (1
− 2𝛼)𝑣ℎ𝐻 
A3 
6 Pop’n defends 
& handler is an 
ST forager 
When to 
defend against 
AGG? 
𝑣𝑓𝑓 <
(1 − 𝛼)(2 + 𝑣ℎ𝑡𝑐𝐻)
𝑡𝑎
− 𝛽𝑣ℎ𝐻 
A4 
7 Pop’n resists & 
handler is an 
ST forager 
When to resist 
against ST? 
𝑣𝑓𝑓 <
2(1 − 𝛽𝑥)
𝑡𝑐
+ (1 − 𝛽
− 𝛽𝑥)𝑣ℎ𝐻 
A5 
8 Pop’n resists & 
handler is an 
AGG forager 
When to resist 
against ST?  
𝑣𝑓𝑓
<
(1 − 𝛽𝑥)(2 + 𝑣ℎ𝑡𝑎𝐻)
𝑡𝑐
− 𝛼𝑣ℎ𝐻 
A6 
9 Pop’n 
surrenders 
When to 
defend against 
AGG? 
𝑣𝑓𝑓 <
2(1 − 𝛼)
𝑡𝑎
− 𝑣ℎ𝐻 
A7 
10 Pop’n 
surrenders 
When to resist 
against ST? 
𝑣𝑓𝑓 <
2(1 − 𝛽𝑥)
𝑡𝑐
− 𝑣ℎ𝐻 
A8 
11 Pop’n doesn’t 
attack & 
mutant AGG 
attacker 
When to 
defend against 
AGG? 
𝑣𝑓𝑓 <
2(1 − 𝛼)
𝑡𝑎
 
A9 
12 Pop’n doesn’t 
attack & 
When to resist 
against ST?  
𝑣𝑓𝑓 <
2(1 − 𝛽𝑥)
𝑡𝑐
 
A10 
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mutant ST 
attacker 
 
 
Table 4. Conditions that need to be satisfied for each of the twelve candidate foraging 
strategies to be an ESS.  
Strategy  Strategy Name  ESS Conditions† 
(1,0,1,0) AGG Defender ∗ 
(0,1,0,1) ST Resistor ∗ 
(1,0,0,1) AGG Resistor 𝐴2 ∩ 𝐴8 ∩ 𝐴7𝑐 
(1,0,0,0) AGG Marauder 𝐴2 ∩ 𝐴8𝑐 ∩ 𝐴7𝑐 
(0,1,1,0) ST Defender 𝐴2 ∩ 𝐴7 ∩ 𝐴8𝑐 
(0,1,0,0) ST Marauder 𝐴2 ∩ 𝐴7𝑐 ∩ 𝐴8𝑐 
(1,0,1,1) AGG Hawk 𝐴1𝑎 ∩ 𝐴3 ∩ 𝐴6 
(0,1,1,1) ST Hawk 𝐴1𝑏 ∩ 𝐴4 ∩ 𝐴5 
(0,0,1,1) Retaliator 𝐴1𝑐 ∩ 𝐴9 ∩ 𝐴10 
(0,0,0,0) Dove ∗ 
(0,0,0,1) ST Retaliator ∗ 
(0,0,1,0) AGG Retaliator ∗ 
 † – Systems of inequalities (A1a to A10, Table 3) that need to be satisfied for a strategy to be 
an ESS. Conditions with a superscript means the complement of that particular condition 
needs to be satisfied as part of the ESS combination. An asterisk indicates there are no 
conditions in which the strategy is an ESS. 
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Table 5. Mean values for model parameters obtained from Billingsgate foraging data.  
Parameter/ 
Strategy 
Meaning of Parameter Value 
𝜶 Probability of winning AGG fight 0.79 
𝜷 Probability of winning ST fight 0.71 
𝒑𝟏 Probability of using aggressive 
(AGG) kleptoparasitism 
0.38 
𝒑𝟐 Probability of using stealth (ST) 
kleptoparasitism 
0.23 
𝒑𝟑 Probability of defending 0.35 
𝒑𝟒 Probability of resisting 0.64 
𝒗𝒇𝒇 Rate at which an individual discovers 
food items 
0.71 
𝒗𝒉 Rate at which a forager discovers 
handlers 
0.83 
𝒕𝒉 Mean handling time for a food item 0.42 
𝒕𝒄 Twice the duration of a stealth (ST) 
fight 
0.14 
𝒕𝒂 Twice the duration of an aggressive 
(AGG) fight 
0.26 
𝒙 Avg. portion of item obtained by ST 0.63 
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Table 6. Equilibrium density results for the Billingsgate population at parameter values 
of 𝒕𝒉 = 𝟎. 𝟒𝟐, 𝒕𝒄 = 𝟎. 𝟏𝟒, 𝒕𝒂 = 𝟎. 𝟐𝟔.  
Behavioural 
Compartment 
Equilibrium Density* Billingsgate Density† 
Handlers (𝑯) ≈2.53 2.52 
Searchers (𝑺) ≈8.5 8.52 
ST attackers (𝑪) ≈0.18 0.18 
Resistors (𝑹) ≈0.18 0.18 
AGG attackers (𝑨) ≈0.31 0.30 
Defenders (𝑫) ≈0.31 0.30 
 *Column 2 shows the density of each compartment at equilibrium for these parameter 
values. †Column 3 shows the density of each compartment actually observed at Billingsgate. 
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Table 7. Values used to investigate the regions of parameter space occupied by different 
ESS’s at Billingsgate.  
Parameter/ 
Strategy 
Meaning of Parameter Value 
𝜶 Probability of winning AGG fight 0.79 
𝜷 Probability of winning ST fight 0.71 
𝒗𝒇𝒇 Rate at which an individual discovers 
food items 
Varied 
𝒗𝒉 Rate at which a forager discovers 
handlers 
0.83 
𝒕𝒉 Mean handling time for a food item 0.42 
𝒕𝒄 Twice the duration of a stealth (ST) 
fight 
0.14 
𝒕𝒂 Twice the duration of an aggressive 
(AGG) fight 
0.26 
𝑷 Population Density Varied 
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Table 8. Frequency with which strategies at Billingsgate were used in the region of 
parameter space where they were an ESS and regions where they were not an ESS.  
Strategy ESS region Non-ESS region 
AGG Resistor 1 8 
AGG Marauder 0 22 
ST Marauder 0 10 
AGG Hawk 9 0 
ST Hawk 2 0 
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